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Co-evolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks
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We explore the coupled dynamics of the internal states of a set of interacting elements and the
network of interactions among them. Interactions are modeled by a spatial game and the network
of interaction links evolves adapting to the outcome of the game. As an example we consider a
model of cooperation, where the adaptation is shown to facilitate the formation of a hierarchical
interaction network that sustains a highly cooperative stationary state. The resulting network
has the characteristics of a small world network when a mechanism of local neighbor selection
is introduced in the adaptive network dynamics. The highly connected nodes in the hierarchical
structure of the network play a leading role in the stability of the network. Perturbations acting on
the state of these special nodes trigger global avalanches leading to complete network reorganization.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
Recent studies on the structure of social, technologi-
cal and biological networks have shown that they share
salient features which situate them far from being com-
pletely regular or random [1, 2, 3]. Most of the mod-
els proposed to construct these networks are grounded
in a graph-theoretical approach, i.e., algorithmic meth-
ods to build graphs formed by elements (the nodes) and
links that evolve according to pre-specified rules. Despite
the progress made, there are still several open questions
[2]. An important issue to be considered among these
questions is that networks are dynamical entities [4] that
evolve and adapt driven by the actions of the elements
that form a network.
The aim of this paper is to analyze a simple setting
of such adaptive and evolving network, in which there is
co-evolution of the state of the elements in the nodes of
the network and the interaction links defining the net-
work. Interactions among elements are modeled with
the aid of game theory [5], frequently applied in social,
economic and biological situations. This mathematical
theory models an interaction involving two (or more) el-
ements, each with two or more ’strategies’ or states, such
that the outcome depends on the choices of all the in-
teracting elements. The outcome is given in the form
of a ‘utility’ or payoff given to each element according
to the selected action of the interacting elements. The
introduction of spatial interactions lead to the develop-
ment of ’spatial games’ [6, 7, 8], where the elements are
located in the nodes of a fixed network of interaction, dis-
playing a rich spatio-temporal dynamics. We go here be-
yond these studies by introducing adaptation (plasticity)
in the coupling between elements, so that the network of
interaction evolves adapting to the outcome of the game.
Our results include new asymptotic steady states, and
the emergence of a hierarchical network structure which
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governs the global dynamics of the system.
The model.- We consider a system composed of N
elements whose interactions are specified by a network
N . The neighborhood of element i , Vi, is composed by
those elements directly connected to i by one link, and
the size of Vi defines its degree ki. The state of each
element xi can be (1, 0) or (0, 1). In each step (gen-
eration), every i-th element interacts with all other ele-
ments inside its neighborhood Vi, and accumulates a pay-
off Πi =
∑
j∈Vi
xiJx
T
j , depending on the chosen states
xi and payoff matrix J =
(
π00 π01
π10 π11
)
. The i-th element
compares its own payoff with all j ∈ Vi and changes its
state to the state of the site with the greatest payoff in
{i} ∪ Vi [7]. The plasticity of the network is introduced
here as network dynamics in which existing links can be
severed and replaced by new ones. We make the assump-
tion that whether an interaction link is severed depends
on the joint payoff, i.e. , the total payoff by the pair of
interacting elements: the interactions giving the lowest
benefit will be removed.
In the remainder, for the sake of concreteness, we
will address the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game, which has been widely used as a model display-
ing complex behavior emerging from the competition be-
tween cooperative and selfish behavior [6]. In its simplest
form, two elements may either choose to cooperate (C,
xC = (1, 0)), or defect (D, xD = (0, 1)). If both elements
choose C, each gets a payoff π00; if one defects while the
other cooperates, the former gets payoff π10 > π00, while
the latter gets the ’suckers’ payoff π01 < π00; if both
defect, each gets π11. Under the standard restrictions
π10+π01 < 2π00, π10 > π00 > π11 > π01, defection is the
best choice in a one-shot game resulting in a Nash equi-
librium where both elements defect. Following previous
studies [7, 8], we consider a simplified version of the game
given by the interaction matrix π00 = 1, π10 = b,π11 = ǫ,
π01 = 0, in the limit ǫ = 0 [9].
In this context the dynamical rule proposed for local
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FIG. 1: Average fraction of cooperative elements, ρC , as a
function of b and p in the stationary regime. The defective
phase ρC = 0 is not included in the averages of ρC . (p = 0 full
triangles, p = 0.01 circles, p = 0.1 squares, p = 1 diamonds)
neighborhood adaptation, plasticity, is defined by ana-
lyzing the joint benefit obtained by each of the possible
pairwise interactions: C–C, C–D, and D–D. Thus, ac-
cording to the payoff obtained the worst interaction is
clearly observed in a D–D situation where both elements
will be better off by searching a new partner. Given this
simplistic analysis, taking into account that we are con-
sidering undirected links, and assuming that the proba-
bility to rewire a C–D interaction is much smaller than
to rewire a D–D interaction, our implementation of plas-
ticity will allow Defectors to exchange (probabilistically)
a D-neighbor by another randomly chosen element.
Thus, the game is divided in three stages. (i) Each
element i plays the PD game with the same current state
with all its neighbors, and collects an aggregate payoff Πi.
(ii) Each element i updates its current state by comparing
its payoff with its neighbors and imitates the state of the
wealthiest element. An element is said satisfied if its own
payoff is the highest among its neighbors (otherwise it is
unsatisfied). (iii) Unsatisfied D-elements which imitate
a Defector, replace this link with probability p by a new
one pointing to a randomly chosen element.
The plasticity parameter p leads to a time evolution of
the local connectivity of the network leaving the average
degree 〈ki〉 constant. The parameter p sets a timescale
for the evolution of the network with respect to the state
update. In general we expect p≪ 1, so that the state up-
date evolves in a much faster timescale than the network
evolution, while p = 1 represents the limit of simultane-
ous update of interactions and states.
We have characterized numerically the model using
N = 10, 000 elements, averaged over 100 different ran-
dom initial conditions, with an initial population of 0.6N
Cooperators randomly distributed in the network [9].
The initial network is generated by randomly distributing
N〈ki〉/2 links. A prototype value of 〈ki〉 = 8 was chosen
in order to secure an initial large connected component.
The game is played synchronously, i.e. , elements decide
their state in advance and they all play at the same time.
Stationary states.- To characterize the macroscopic be-
FIG. 2: Partial view of a sample imitation network in a
steady state. Elements on a lower layer imitate the state of
elements in an upper layer.
havior of the system we introduce the fraction of cooper-
ators at a given time, ρC(t). We define the order param-
eter ρC as the average over realizations of the stationary
cooperators density. In the case of random mixing, i.e.
in the absence of an interaction network, population dy-
namics gives [11] ρ˙C = ρ
2
C(1 − ρC)(1 − b) . Thus, for
b > 1 the only stable solution corresponds to a fully de-
fective population. For fixed networks (p = 0), a typical
time evolution shows in general that the order parame-
ter fluctuates around an average value that decreases as
the incentive to defect b increases (Fig. 1). At b ≃ 2 the
defectors dominate the network [12]. For fixed networks,
the precise value for this transition has been studied in
detail [7, 12, 13]. In contrast to random mixing, context
preservation (fixed interactions) sustains partial cooper-
ation [14].
This picture changes when the elements turn on their
plasticity behavior (p > 0) [see Fig. 1]. Extensive nu-
merical simulations show that the system either reaches
a stationary configuration with ρC > 0 (where the states
and the network do not change in time), or an absorbing
state with all elements being Defectors ρC = 0. The co-
operative phase –the stationary states with a large value
of ρC– is formed by a set of solutions, corresponding to
different network configurations and distribution of co-
operators. In Fig. 1 we characterize these states showing
that ρC > 0.8, a value always much larger than in the
non-adaptive case. Slight variations exist for different
〈k〉 ≥ 4. The crucial difference is the disappearance of
the behavior observed in the case p = 0 in which, in-
creasing b, the large majority of the realizations reaches
a configuration with a very low fraction of cooperators.
The plasticity parameter p changes the time it takes to
reach the stationary state: smaller p produce longer tran-
sients.
Network structure.- In order to understand how such
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FIG. 3: Normalized variance σ2n = (〈k
2
i 〉 − 〈ki〉
2)/〈ki〉 as a
function of b. The solid line (σ2n = 1) correspond to the
fixed random network with a Poisson distribution of degree.
Parameter values as in Fig. 1.
a highly cooperative structure can be sustained, we ana-
lyze the implications of the proposed dynamical rules in
the network structure. Consider that element i updates
its state imitating the state of element j; we define the
correspondence l : N → N such that l(i) = j. Focusing
only on those links, we identify the imitation network
as the sub-network composed of directed links i → l(i)
(Fig. 2). A necessary and sufficient condition for a sta-
tionary state (ρC > 0, p 6= 0) is (a) there are no links
between two Defectors, and (b) each C-neighbor i of a
Defector γ, satisfies the payoff relation:
Πj > Πγ > Πi, j = l(i) (1)
In other words, in a stationary state all defectors become
satisfied interacting only with cooperators, while coop-
erators can be unsatisfied while imitating from other co-
operators. These steady state conditions naturally imply
that the element with largest payoff in a stationary con-
figuration is a satisfied cooperator. In Fig. 2 we show a
partial view (the nodes in the lowest level are not shown)
of an imitation network, where the nodes in a layer im-
itate those elements in an upper layer indicated by the
directed edges. At the top of the figure lie the nodes
whose action is imitated by a chain of Cooperators.
A first characterization of how the structure of the co-
operative stationary network configurations changes as a
function of b and p is obtained by measuring the normal-
ized degree variance σ2n = (〈k
2
i 〉 − 〈ki〉
2)/〈ki〉 (Fig. 3).
We find that the degree distribution departs significantly
from the initial Poisson distribution (σ2n = 1) only for
large values of the plasticity parameter p. For increas-
ing b the tail of the degree distribution expands and ap-
proaches an exponential form, indicating some elements
become more connected than others (hubs).
We now address the question of whether the structure
generated in our dynamical model has the characteristics
of a small world network [1]. The clustering coefficient
c measures the fraction of neighbors of a node that are
connected among them, averaged over all the nodes in
the network. In our simulations we find (Fig. 4) that the
clustering coefficient increases very mildly with respect
to a fixed random network crand = 〈ki〉/N [15]. Thus,
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
b
1
10
100
c/
c ra
n
d
FIG. 4: Normalized clustering coefficient c/crand as a func-
tion of b. For p = 0 we recover the random value. Open
symbols for q=0.01 (diamonds p = 0.01; squares p = 0.1;
circles p = 1); filled circles correspond to p = 1 and q = 0.
even though the average path length is similar to a ran-
dom network, in order to account for the high clustering
we need to introduce “local” neighbor selection [16]. This
mechanism is easily implemented introducing a parame-
ter q that modifies [step (iii)], so that with probability q
the new neighbor is selected among the neighbors of the
neighbors; otherwise with probability 1 − q the random
neighbor is chosen. We find that, while most of our re-
sults previously discussed are qualitatively independent
of the value of q, the clustering coefficient reaches a very
large value even for a small value of q. For instance,
a slightly 1% (q = 0.01) of local neighbor selection is
enough to increase c a hundred times, being the cluster-
ing largest for a slow evolution of the network (p≪ 1). In
addition, the clustering coefficient decreases slightly with
system size, an indication of a decay slower than the N−1
decay expected for random graphs. All together our re-
sults indicate that local neighbor selection is needed in
order to generate a small world network.
It is worth noting that an evolutionary model based on
the PD game with a more complex strategy representa-
tion also shows, in the absence of local neighbor selection,
that the increase of the clustering coefficient can be re-
lated to the change of the degree distribution [15]. In
contrast with Ref. [15], we don’t observe a power law
degree distribution.
Dynamics: global avalanches and network stability.-
The hierarchical structure of the network is of fundamen-
tal importance to the dynamics on the system. A closer
look at the the evolution towards a stationary state indi-
cates the presence of avalanches (Fig. 5). The transient
dynamics is characterized in general by large oscillations
in ρC(t). When the payoff of any D element increases
above the upper limit of Eq. (1), an avalanche towards
defection is triggered. This D element will be imitated by
C neighbors, and each will initiate an avalanche of repli-
cation of D state through all those elements connected by
the imitation network. During the avalanche, recovery of
cooperation is possible through those satisfied Coopera-
tors, which re-build the hierarchical topology [17].
The description in terms of the imitation network also
indicates the vulnerability of the structure to stochastic
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FIG. 5: Time evolution of ρC . The evolution starts in a fixed
random network (p = 0 up to time t = 200 when network
dynamics is switched on, so that p = 1 for t > 200. At time
t = 500 the state of the node with largest payoff is forced
from C to D. Parameter b = 1.7.
fluctuations. Figure 5 illustrates the sensitivity of the
stationary network structure to perturbations acting on
the highly connected nodes, which reflects their key role
in sustaining cooperation. At time t = 500, the most
connected node is externally forced to change state from
C to D, triggering an avalanche. Notice the large os-
cillations in ρC , reproducing the transient dynamics in
which the system searches for a new stationary globally
cooperative structure.
Conclusion.- We have addressed the general question
of network formation from the perspective of co-evolution
between the dynamics of the elements’ state and the in-
teractions network. Our model of cooperation with net-
work plasticity leads to hierarchical topologies [18], the
emergence of global cascades [19, 20] and vulnerability
to attacks acting on specific targets [21]. The hierarchi-
cal interaction network is reached as a stationary network
starting form a random network of interactions. The net-
work appears structured from a few highly connected el-
ements easily identified through the imitation network.
Such network has the characteristics of a small world
when a mechanism of local neighbor selection is intro-
duced in the adaptive dynamics of the network. The hi-
erarchical structure supports a stationary highly cooper-
ative state for general situations in which for a fixed net-
work the system would not settle in a stationary state and
in which the cooperation level would be much smaller.
The stability of the network is very sensitive to changes in
state of the few highly connected nodes: external pertur-
bations acting on these nodes, trigger global avalanches
leading to transient dynamics in which the network com-
pletely reorganizes itself searching for a new highly coop-
erative stationary state. Future work should explore the
robustness of these results in slightly different settings.
For instance we have checked that the same qualitative
results are obtained with asynchronous update regard-
ing Figure 1, and that adding continuous noise weakens
the cooperative phase by the spontaneous occurrence of
avalanches. Work along these lines is in progress.
We acknowledge financial support from MCyT (Spain)
and FEDER (EU) through Projects CONOCE and
BFM2002-04474-C02-01.
[1] D.J. Watts, S.H. Strogatz, Nature 393, 440 (1998).
[2] S.H. Strogatz, Nature 410, 268 (2001).
[3] R. Albert A.-L. Baraba´si, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 47 (2002);
S.N. Dorogovtsev, J.F.F. Mendes, Adv. Phys. 51, 1079
(2002); M.E.J. Newman, SIAM Review 45, 167-256
(2003).
[4] B. Skyrms, R. Pemantle, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 97
9340 (2000).
[5] J. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory (MIT University
Press, 1996).
[6] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books,
New York (1984).
[7] M.A. Nowak, R.M. May, Nature 359, 826 (1992); M.A.
Nowak, R.M. May, Int. J. Bif. Chaos 3, 35 (1993); M.A.
Nowak, S. Bonhoeffer, R.M. May, Int. J. Bif. Chaos 4,
33 (1994).
[8] G. Szabo, C. Toke, Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998); G.
Abramson, M. Kuperman, Phys. Rev E 63, 030901
(2001); H. Ebel, S. Bornholdt, Phys. Rev. E 66, 056118
(2002); B.J. Kim, et al, Phys. Rev. E 66, 021907 (2002).
[9] We checked as in Ref. [12] that considering 0.1 > ǫ ≥ 0,
no noticeble difference is found in this game.
[10] Several intermediate values of the initial density of Co-
operators show that general dynamical properties are not
changed. However, decreasing the initial density of coop-
erator increases the chances to get trapped in the absorb-
ing state ρC = 0.
[11] J. Hofbauer, K. Sigmund, Evolutionary games and pop-
ulation dynamics, Cambridge University Press (1998).
[12] K. Lindgren, M.G. Nordahl, Physica D 75, 292 (1994).
[13] F. Schweitzer, L. Behera, H. Muehlenbein, Adv. in Com-
plex Systems 5, 269 (2002).
[14] M. Cohen, R. Riolo, R. Axelrod, ’The emergence of social
organization in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: how context-
preservation and other factors promote cooperation’,
Santa Fe Institute Working Paper 99-01-002 (1999).
[15] H. Ebel, S. Bornholdt, cond-mat/0211666.
[16] E.M. Jin, M. Girvan, M.E.J. Newman, Phys. Rev. E 64,
046132 (2001).
[17] M.G. Zimmermann, V.M. Egu´ıluz, M. San Miguel, in
Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, A.
Kirman, J.-B. Zimmermann eds. (Springer, Berlin, 2001)
[18] E. Ravasz, A.-L. Barabasi, Phys. Rev. E 67, 026112
(2003).
[19] S. Jain, S. Krishna, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 5684-5687
(1998). S. Jain, S. Krishna, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2001
98, 543 (2001).
[20] D.J. Watts, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 99, 5766 (2002).
[21] R. Albert, H. Jeong, A.-L. Barabasi, Nature 406, 378
(2000); R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham, and S.
Havlin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 4626 (2000); 86, 3682 (2001).
